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The Transformative Power of Europe Reloaded
The Limits of External Europeanization
Tanja A. Börzel
Freie Universität Berlin
Abstract
With the borders of the European Union (EU) moved eastwards, students of Europeanization have been 
awarded yet another real-world experiment. This paper explores to what extent existing Europeanization 
approaches travel beyond the EU’s border to its South Eastern and Eastern neighbours, which are marked 
by “bad governance” with regard to both the effectiveness and democratic legitimacy of their domestic 
institutions. The first part outlines key insights of the literature on “Europeanization West” regarding the 
outcomes and the mechanism of the domestic impact of the EU. Then, I summarize the main findings of 
research on “Europeanization East” focusing on factors that have limited or at least qualified the domestic 
impact of the EU in the ten Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) countries in comparison to the EU 15 (those 
that were members before the 2004 enlargement). This paper discusses to what extent the concepts 
and causal mechanisms need even further qualification when applied to countries, such as the European 
Neighbourhood Countries (ENC), that are neither willing nor necessarily capable of adapting to Europe 
and that do not even have the incentive of EU membership to cope with the costs. I will argue that the 
EU is unlikely to deploy any transformative power in its neighbourhood as long as it does not adjust its 
“accession tool box” to countries the EU does not want to take on as members. The paper concludes with 
some considerations on the policy implications of the EU’s approach of “move closer but don’t touch” 
which has started to creep into its relations with the Western Balkans and Turkey.
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1.  Introduction1
With the ever-growing transfer of competences to the European Union (EU), students of European 
politics have become increasingly interested in how European integration has transformed the domestic 
institutions, policies, and political processes in the member states. Eastern enlargement created a unique 
opportunity for the next generation of Europeanization research to test the various approaches that had 
emerged to account for the conditions and causal mechanisms through which the EU triggers domestic 
change. We know by now that Europeanization in the Central and Eastern European (CEE) accession 
countries (‘CEE 10’) has evolved in somewhat different ways than in the old member states (‘EU 15’) and 
has not completely met our theoretical expectations, both with regard to process and outcomes. The 
historical trajectories and the peculiarities of the accession process, by which candidate countries have 
to Europeanize as a condition and not a consequence of membership, have significantly mitigated the 
domestic impact of the EU.
With the borders of the EU having moved eastwards, students of Europeanization have been awarded 
yet another real-world experiment. As in case of the CEE – and the Western Balkan countries – the EU 
seeks to transform the domestic structures of the Newly Independent States (NIS) that used to be part 
of the Soviet Union and now form the immediate backyard of the EU. In order to foster peace, stability 
and prosperity in its near abroad, the EU seeks to build a “ring of friends” (European Commission 2003a) 
that share the same norms and principles of good governance as the EU and its member states and adapt 
their domestic institutions and policies accordingly. Unlike the CEE states, however, the neighbourhood 
countries appear to be stuck in transition and suffer from serious problems of both weak state capacity 
and defect democracy. This is what they share with most of the Western Balkans. But unlike them, the 
“neighbours of Europe” do not have a membership perspective, at least not in the foreseeable future. 
Nor have they been subject to the intense and still ongoing state-building and democratization efforts of 
international and transnational actors, among which the EU has been only one, albeit a prominent one.
This paper will explore to what extent existing Europeanization approaches travel beyond the EU’s border 
to its South East and Eastern neighbours, which are marked by “bad governance” with regard to both 
the effectiveness and democratic legitimacy of their domestic institutions.2 I will start with outlining key 
insights of the literature on “Europeanization West” regarding the outcomes and the mechanism of the 
domestic impact of the EU. I will then summarize the main findings of research on “Europeanization East” 
focusing on factors that have limited or at least qualified the domestic impact of the EU in the ten Central 
1 The paper heavily draws on findings of the research project B2 Gutes	Regieren	ohne	den	Schatten	der	Hierar-
chie?	Korruptionsbekämpfung	im	südlichen	Kaukasus	im	Rahmen	der	EU-Nachbarschaftspolitik, which is part of 
the Collaborative Research Center SFB 700 Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood, funded by the German 
Research Foundation (DFG) (http://www.sfb-governance.de/teilprojekte/projektbereich_b/b2/index.html). I am 
enormously grateful to Yasemin Pamuk and Andreas Stahn for providing me with empirical material for this paper. 
I also thank Juan Diez Medrano, Thomas Risse, Amy Verdun, and the participants of the research seminars of the 
Research College “The Transformative Power of Europe” and of the Institut Barcelona d’Estudis Internacionals for 
their excellent comments.
2 It would be beyond the scope of this paper to include the countries, which are associated with EU as members of 
the European Economic Area (Lavenex et al. 2009; Emerson et al. 2002; Smith 1999). Moreover, the relationship 
of the EU with Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Switzerland (which has a bilateral association agreement with 
the EU) is far less asymmetric since they are involved in formulation and enforcement of EU internal market po-
licies. Nor do they suffer from problems of bad governance.
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and Eastern European countries that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 (‘CEE 10’) in comparison to the 
fifteen member states that were in the EU before the 2004 enlargement (‘EU 15’). The bulk of the paper 
will discuss to what extent the concepts and causal mechanisms need even further qualification when 
applied to countries, such as the European Neighbourhood Countries (ENC), that are neither willing nor 
necessarily capable of adapting to the EU and that do not even have the prospect of EU membership 
to look forward to cope with the costs or anticipate the full benefits. In this paper I argue that the EU is 
unlikely to deploy much transformative power in its South Eastern and Eastern neighbourhood as long as it 
does not adjust its “accession tool box” that is uses to engage with countries that are unlikely be given EU 
membership prospective in the foreseeable future. The paper concludes with some considerations on the 
policy implications of the EU’s approach of “move closer but don’t touch” which has started to creep into 
its relations with the Western Balkans and Turkey, which do have a membership perspective that looks, 
however, ever less credible.
2.  Europeanization in the “West”: The Domestic Impact of Europe on the “Old”  
 Member States
The literature has demonstrated convincingly that Europeanization has indeed occurred in the EU 15. 
Yet, the scope and the direction of domestic change are far from clear. This is not the place to rehearse 
the debate on how much change the EU has caused in the policies, institutions and political processes 
of the member states, which has been done successfully elsewhere (Cowles/Risse 2001; Héritier et al. 
2001; Featherstone/Radaelli 2003; Bulmer/Lequesne 2005; Graziano/Vink 2006). Suffice to say that most 
students of Europeanization agree that the domestic impact of the EU is differential. While EU policies 
and institutions are an impetus of domestic change that is a constant for all member states, they have 
facilitated domestic reforms but not necessarily led to convergence of national polities, politics or policies. 
To solve the empirical puzzle, the literature has drawn on two different strands of institutionalist thinking. 
Rationalist and constructivist approaches of Europeanization both assume that the misfit between 
European and domestic policies, institutions and political processes constitutes a necessary condition for 
domestic change and that institutions mediate or filter the domestic impact of Europe, which emanates 
from pressure of adaptation caused by such misfit. They differ, however, in their assumptions in exactly 
how institutions matter (cf. Börzel/Risse 2003). 
Rational choice institutionalism argues that the EU facilitates domestic change through changing 
opportunity structures for domestic actors. In a first step, misfit between the EU and domestic norms 
creates demands for domestic adaptation. It takes agency, however, to translate misfit into domestic 
change. In a second step, the downloading of EU policies and institutions by the member states are 
shaped by cost/benefit calculations of strategic actors, whose interests are at stake. Institutions constrain 
or enable certain actions of rational actors by rendering some options more costly than others. From 
this perspective, Europeanization is largely conceived as an emerging political opportunity structure 
which offers some actors additional resources to exert influence, while severely constraining the ability of 
others to pursue their goals. Domestic change is facilitated, if the institutions of the member states do not 
allow domestic actors to block adaptation to EU requirements through veto points or if, on the contrary, 
they empower domestic reform coalitions by providing them with additional resources to exploit the 
opportunities offered by Europeanization. 
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Other parts of the Europeanization literature draw on sociological institutionalism in order to specify 
change mechanisms based on ideational and normative processes of Europeanization. Unlike its rationalist 
counterpart, sociological institutionalism draws on a normative logic of appropriateness which argues 
that actors are guided by collectively shared understandings of what constitutes proper, socially accepted 
behaviour. These collective understandings and intersubjective meaning structures strongly influence the 
way actors define their goals and what they perceive as rational action. Rather than maximizing their 
egoistic self-interest, actors seek to meet social expectations in a given situation. From this perspective, 
Europeanization is understood as the emergence of new rules, norms, practices, and structures of meaning 
to which member states are exposed and which they have to incorporate into their domestic structures. 
If there is such a misfit, it also takes agency for bringing about domestic change. But the ways in which 
domestic actors facilitate reforms are different. Norm entrepreneurs such as epistemic communities 
or advocacy networks socialize domestic actors into new norms and rules of appropriateness through 
persuasion and social learning who redefine their interests and identities accordingly. The more active 
norm entrepreneurs are and the more they succeed in making EU policies resonate with domestic norms 
and beliefs, the more successful they will be in bringing about domestic change. Moreover, collective 
understandings of appropriate behaviour strongly influence the ways in which domestic actors download 
EU requirements. First, a consensus-oriented or cooperative decision-making culture helps to overcome 
multiple veto points by rendering their use for actors inappropriate. Second, a consensus-oriented political 
culture allows for a sharing of adaptational costs which facilitates the accommodation of pressure for 
adaptation. Rather than shifting adaptational costs upon a social or political minority, the “winners” of 
domestic change compensate the “losers”.
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Figure	1:	Two	Logics	of	Europeanization	and	Domestic	Change
The two approaches have been quite adequate to account for the differential impact of the EU on the 
policy, polity, and politics of the member states. While they have been criticized for conceptualizing 
Europeanization as a one-way street (Olsen 2002), the original top-down perspective appears to be 
appropriate when studying the domestic impact of the EU on countries that have no say in EU decision-
making and whose relationship with the EU is asymmetrical.
Börzel and Risse 2003.
Figure 1: Two Logics of Europeanization and Domestic Change
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 3.  Europeanization Goes East: The Domestic Impact of Europe on the CEE   
 Accession States
External Europeanization has corroborated the differential impact of Europe (cf. Schimmelfennig/
Sedelmeier 2005a; Sedelmeier 2006). Europeanization has had more similar effects on accession countries 
than on member states in relation to strengthening core executives across the board and increasing 
their autonomy from domestic political and societal pressures. It has also led to the development of a 
less politicized civil service (Goetz 2005), tempered party competition (Vachudova 2008) and to some 
degree of decentralization and regionalization, at least in comparison with the Communist legacy (Bruszt 
2008). At the same time, however, Europeanization effects on institutions and politics vary considerably. 
EU political conditionality was successful only in cases of unstable democracies where democratic and 
authoritarian and nationalist forces competed for power by strengthening liberal politics and locking-
in democratic reforms (Slovakia,  Bulgaria, and Rumania), while being irrelevant in those countries with 
strong democratic constituencies (most of the CEE countries; see Vachudova 2005; Schimmelfennig 2005). 
In general, there has been little institutional convergence around a single European model of governance. 
Similar to member state Europeanization, acquis conditionality had a more pervasive effect on policy 
change. To what extent can Europeanization approaches account for these findings?
Misfit and pressure for adaptation exerted by the EU have been much higher than in case of the old 
member states. First, the CEE accession countries had to adopt the entire body of EU Law within a few years 
adopting hundreds of pieces of legislation and building-up the necessary administrative capacities to apply 
and enforce them. The policy and institutional misfit was considerable and imposed tremendous costs of 
adaptation at the domestic level. While the EU had no means to legally coerce the candidate countries 
into compliance, “accession conditionality” gave the European Commission a powerful tool to pressure 
candidate countries towards down-loading the comprehensive acquis	 communautaire and introducing 
institutional reforms (cf. Schimmelfennig/Sedelmeier 2005a; Dimitrova 2004; Linden 2002; Jacoby 2004). 
Next to positive and negative incentives, EU pre-accession funds assisted the CEE governments in paying-
off some of the adaptational costs. To help the accession countries implement the acquis, PHARE (Poland 
and Hungary: Aid for Restructuring of the Economies), ISPA (Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-
Accession) or SAPARD (Special Accession Program for Agricultural and Rural Development) provided 
significant financial and technical assistance (cf. Sissenich 2007: 54-57). 
At the same time, domestic veto players who incurred (some of) these costs and sought to block domestic 
reforms were considered to be weak or absent, particularly with regard to policy changes, which usually 
did not impose prohibitive compliance costs either (Schimmelfennig/Sedelmeier 2006 but see Noutcheva/
Bechev 2008). Unlike in the EU member states, footdraggers of domestic reforms were rather found 
among governments and parties in fragile democracies (Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia) for whom compliance 
with the EU’s Copenhagen Criteria meant a direct loss of their political (and at times economic) powers 
(Schimmelfennig/Sedelmeier 2005). Societal and economic interests, by contrast, were generally weak 
because of the authoritarian legacy of socialist regimes (Sissenich 2007; Howard 2003). While they often 
had not sufficient capacities to resist change, non-governmental actors hardly acted as change agents 
either since they lacked the resources to pull down EU policies to the domestic level (cf. Börzel 2009). The 
EU explicitly required the involvement of non-state actors in the implementation of EU policies, to increase 
both their effectiveness and their legitimacy. It also sought to strengthen civil society organizations and 
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companies in the accession process by providing them with funding and training (Sissenich 2007; Andonova 
2003; Iankova 2009). Yet, tight implementation schedules offered them little opportunity to lobby national 
decision-makers for a correct and complete implementation of EU policies. Nor did societal and economic 
actors have sufficient personnel, information, expertise, money and organizational resources to act as 
watchdogs of practical application and enforcement. Overall, Europeanization empowered reform actors 
within government rather than within society (Zubek 2008; Raik 2004). If veto players mattered, they 
delayed rather than forestalled compliance with EU requirements (Schimmelfennig/Sedelmeier 2006). 
Domestic resistance and institutional inertia, finally, were mitigated by the confluence of domestic 
transformation and accession with political and economic institutions being still in flux (Héritier 2005).
While the rationalist mechanisms of “differential empowerment through conditionality” seamed to 
dominate the accession process of the ten CEE countries (Andonova 2003; Grabbe 2006; Vachudova 2005; 
Pridham 2005), socialization and social learning did play a role, too (Schimmelfennig/Sedelmeier 2005a; 
Kelley 2004b; Kubicek 2003). Next to financial and technical assistance, the EU also provided accession 
countries with legitimacy to enact domestic change. The strong domestic consensus in favour of EU 
membership in their “return to Europe” allowed CEE decision-makers to silence domestic veto players 
inside and outside government, despite the considerable costs incurred by EU policies. Moreover, the 
Copenhagen Criteria strongly resonated with the reform agenda of policy-makers and large parts of the 
societies in the CEE countries supporting political and economic transition started by the “velvet revolution” 
in 1989. The legitimacy of the EU generated sufficient diffuse support through the identification with 
Europe that often trumped cost/benefit calculations in the adoption of and adaptation to the acquis 
communautaire	and balanced nationalist beliefs. It also facilitated access and influence of (trans-)national 
norm entrepreneurs who had little difficulties in invoking the resonance of EU requirements with domestic 
norms and values as to increase their acceptance and promote their internalization. While it did not forge 
completely new identities, EU accession reinforced the identification with Europe (Risse 2010).
Overall, rationalist and sociological institutionalist approaches are well equipped to explain the (differential) 
impact of pre-accession or Enlargement Europeanization in the CEE candidate countries. While domestic 
mediating factors played a less prominent role than in membership Europeanization, they did mitigate 
the domestic impact of accession, particularly beyond the legal implementation of EU policies (Börzel 
2009). Moreover, the dominance of “differential empowerment through conditionality” has given rise 
to concerns about “shallow Europeanization” (Goetz 2005: 262) or “Potemkin harmonization” (Jacoby 
1999) since sustainable compliance with (costly) EU policies ultimately requires internalization. While the 
EU introduced impressive reforms “on paper, developments on the ground are modest to nil” (Mungiu-
Pippidi 2005: 22). The CEE countries formally adopted a massive amount of EU legislation, which, however, 
is often not properly applied and enforced and thus, has not changed actors’ behaviour (Falkner et al. 
2008; Börzel 2009). Such institutional decoupling was to be expected. Why should CEE countries invest 
their still scarce resources in “deep Europeanization” after the major incentive of membership was lost? 
Another factor that has limited the domestic impact of EU accession and accounts for its differential 
outcome is the limited administrative capacities of the candidate countries (Schimmelfennig/Sedelmeier 
2006; Noutcheva/Bechev 2008; Börzel 2009). Such concerns are even more relevant to the European 
Neighbourhood Countries (ENC), which do not even have an accession perspective.
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4.  Hitting (Beyond) its Borders: The Domestic Impact of Europe on Neighbouring  
 Countries
With its “big bang” Enlargement, the EU has sought to expand the reach of its transformative power to 
the new neighbours. But can the EU promote good governance in its geographical vicinity without offering 
the golden carrot of membership? According to the Europeanization literature, the EU’s domestic impact 
depends on five factors: 
(1) the costs	of	adaptation	as function of the misfit between EU requirements and domestic  
 conditions, 
(2) the external push of the EU to comply with its requirements: 
Misfit and external push combine in the pressure for adaptation the EU exerts on a target country.
(3) the capacity of the target country to respond to the EU’s pressure for adaptation,
(4) the willingness of the target country to respond to the EU’s pressure for adaptation,
(5) the power of the target country to resist the EU’s pressure for adaptation. 
The costs of adaption constitute a challenge for domestic actors in general. The more EU requirements for 
liberal reforms challenge the power base of incumbent regimes, the higher the political costs. However, 
the willingness, capacity and power to cope with them vary among the various types of actors.
First, state capacity, defined as the capacity to formulate, implement, and enforce reforms, is a decisive 
pre-condition for state actors to adopt and adapt to EU demands for domestic change. Moreover, non-
state actors (civil society and business) equally require the capacity to push the reform agenda at the 
domestic level by exerting pressure on state actors, talking them into domestic change and/or providing 
them with additional resources. Finally, the EU might be less inclined to push for domestic change in states 
whose institutions are already fragile. Thus, both the capacity of state and non-state actors play a crucial 
role in mitigating the transformative power of the EU.
Second, the democratic quality of a regime influences the willingness of state actors to promote domestic 
change (cf. Schimmelfennig 2005). The costs of adaptation for incumbent governments of democratic 
states with market economies are lower than for authoritarian regimes, which have a firm grip on economy 
and society as a result of which compliance with EU requirements threatens their hold on power. At the 
same time, the latter are less likely to face pressure from below since domestic actors lack the political 
autonomy to mobilize in favour of compliance with EU demands for reform.
Third, the interdependence between the EU and a target country crucially shapes the degree of pressure 
for adaptation the EU is likely to exert, on the one hand, and the power of the target country to resist such 
pressure. The economic and political power of the EU renders its external relations with neighbouring 
countries rather asymmetric.3 In principle, the ENC have much more to gain with closer relations with 
the EU giving the EU more power. However, some states possess resources (gas, oil) the EU is interested 
3 The exception is Russia, of course. For the relationship of power and interdependence see Keohane/Nye 1977.
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in, are of strategic importance and/or have the potential to create substantial negative externalities for 
the EU (illegal immigration, cross-border crime). Strategic or economic goals can seriously undermine the 
consistency of the EU in pushing for domestic change (Smith 2001; Youngs 2001: 90f), particularly if the 
target countries do not possess a membership perspective (Maier/Schimmelfennig 2007; Schimmelfennig/
Scholtz 2009).
In a nutshell, the less democratic and the weaker a state is, the higher the domestic costs of Europeanization 
and the lower the willingness and the capacity of governments and other domestic actors to deal with 
them. The EU can influence both willingness and capacity to reform by providing additional incentives 
and resources, and it successfully did so in the case of the CEE accession countries. Yet, the European 
Neighbourhood Countries (ENC) are in a completely different situation. Not only do they lack a membership 
perspective, the ENC also score much lower on democracy and state capacity than the CEE (see figure 2). 
Thus, we should expect a much weaker domestic impact of the EU, particularly since “Neighbourhood 
Europeanization” has fostered even less socialization and lesson-drawing processes than “Enlargement 
Europeanization” did (Gawrich et al. 2009).
Figure	2:	State	Capacity	and	Democracy	Compared
Figure 2: State Capacity and Democracy Compared
1998
TR
AL
BIH
AZ
BY
ARM
UA
GE
MD
MK
BG
RO
SK
GR
GB
AL
D
EST
SLO
H
LV
CZ
LT
PL
P
S
A
L
IRL DK
FIN
NL
HR
EU-15
CEE-10
WB
ENC
Turkey
100
80
60
40
20
0
1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0
Average WB
Average ENC
Average CEE
Average EU
Freedom House Status
W
or
ld
 B
an
k 
Re
gu
la
tiv
e 
Q
ua
lit
y 
                                 The Transformative Power of Europe Reloaded | 13
The breakdown of the Soviet Union in 1991 created the so-called “Newly Independent States” (NIS) and 
immediately posed enormous political, economic and social challenges. Institutional instability, economic 
decline and the incumbent governments’ failure to perform necessary political and economic reforms led 
to widespread poverty and political apathy. Moreover, ethnic violence and regional conflicts have further 
strained the political and economic outlook of most of the post-Soviet countries and contributed to the 
consolidation of systems of “bad governance” that are plagued by pervasive corruption and state capture 
(Hellman et al. 2000).
By the end of the 1990s, it had become clear that the successor states of the Soviet Union performed 
much worse than the post-communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe, with regard to both 
economic and political transition (figure 2, cf. Bunce 2001; Kopstein/Reilly 2000). In 1998, the average 
Freedom House score for the six ENC was 4.31 (partly free, out of 7.0 = not free) as compared to 1.7 
(free) of the CEE 10 (2.61 in 1992).4 Moldova (3.0), Georgia (3.50) and the Ukraine (3.50) scored better 
than most of the Western Balkans (average 4.50) and Turkey (4.50) at the time. But unlike the Western 
Balkans, the ENC democracy score deteriorated (4.81 in 2008). They are still semi-authoritarian regimes 
(Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Moldova) or even full-fledged autocracies (Belarus) (cf. Bunce/Wolchik 
2008). The Ukraine appears to be the only exception, although its progress towards democracy remains 
ambiguous (Gawrich et al. 2009). Overall, the ENC appear to be “stuck in conditions of phoney democracy”, 
that is they formally look like democracies but “corrupted parties of power made a mockery of democratic 
norms and values” (Emerson 2005: 1).
A similar pattern can be observed with regard to the ENC performance in fostering business environment 
and promoting private sector development (regulatory quality), which is a fair measure of state capacity.5 
While regulatory quality varies considerably among the ENC, their overall capacity to introduce domestic 
reforms was and has remained much more limited compared to the CEE countries during their accession 
negotiations (figure 2, cf. Hellmann et al. 2002; Noutcheva/Emerson 2007).
Overall, the CEE countries were much closer to the EU member states with regard to both democracy 
and state capacity than the ENC. When in 2004, the “big bang” Enlargement placed them into the EU’s 
immediate vicinity, the fear of spreading political instability, organized crime and illegal migration induced 
the EU once again to deploy its transformative power trying to hit beyond its border. While they have 
suffered from similar or even worse problems of weak state capacity and defect democracy than the 
Western Balkans, the ENC have not obtained a membership perspective. I will return to this point in the 
concluding part of the paper.
4 Freedom House (FH) is a rather rough measure for the democratic quality of a regime. Polity IV provides a more 
differentiated methodology. Yet, Polity IV has more missing values for the Western Balkans in 1998. Data for 2008 
is not yet available. For the purpose of this paper, the FH Index should be sufficient. The combination of political 
rights and civil liberties corresponds to the EU’ conception of liberal democracy (Schimmelfennig 2008: 922). The 
data was obtained from http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=439; last access August 25, 2009.
5 Measuring state capacity is rather difficult. Most indices do not restrict their focus on the capacity of the state to 
effectively formulate and implement policies, but also include normative aspects regarding the content of state 
policies (e.g. Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI)). This paper therefore uses the Regulatory Quality Index of 
the World Bank, which appears to capture what comes closest to the capacity of states to adopt and adapt to EU 
requirements for introducing domestic reforms. Country scores are listed as percentile ranks of countries with 
a worse governance performance than the relative country. The data was obtained from http://info.worldbank.
org/governance/wgi/resources.htm; last access August 29, 2009.
14 | KFG Working Paper No. 11 | February 2010 
The following section will explore how limited state capacity and democracy have mitigated and 
constrained the domestic impact of the EU when it seeks to hit beyond its borders with its European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The ENP provides a comprehensive institutional framework by which the 
EU seeks to engage its Southern and Eastern neighbours in political and economic reform and externally 
induce Europeanization. It does not only define the goals and contents of Europeanization but also entails 
a toolbox or set of instruments that easily translate into the Europeanization mechanisms discussed above 
(cf. Schimmelfennig 2007; Magen/Morlino 2008; Börzel/Risse 2009). For reasons of scope I will focus on 
the Eastern dimension of the ENP, which involves the six Western Newly Independent States.6
4.1  Drawing Closer to Europe
After the break up of the Soviet Union, the EU was quick to recognize its successor states. In order to 
support the Newly Independent States (NIS) in coping with the consequences of the “triple transition” 
(Offe 1991) in democracy, market, and state capacity, the EU initially concentrated on the support for their 
institutional capacity building and advancement of economic reforms through the Technical Assistance for 
the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) programme.7 By formalizing its relations with the TACIS 
countries, the EU sought to further encourage the transition of the NIS into efficient and effective state 
institutions, full-fledged market economies and, to a lesser extent, to liberal democracies (cf. Hillion 2000; 
Petrov 2002). When Eastern enlargement made the Western NIS immediate neighbours of the EU, the 
European Commission proposed a new framework to respond to the geographical and political changes. 
The European Neighbourhood Policy, launched in 2003, is an attempt to integrate the geographical entities 
bordering the EU into a single policy (European Commission 2003a). The approximation of its neighbours 
with key parts of the acquis shall turn them into an area of security, stability, and prosperity (cf. Weber et 
al. 2007). In order to draw the ENC closer, the EU has heavily relied on the methods and instruments that 
it held so successful in the accession of the CEE countries (Kelley 2006). 
Since 1991, the relations of the EU with its Eastern neighbours have evolved in several steps each envisaging 
a deepening of cooperation. Accordingly, the EU’s demand for improving governance by engaging 
in substantial domestic reforms has increased significantly over the past years, potentially imposing 
prohibitive costs of adaptation on the six ENC. However, so far the ENC governments have refrained from 
embracing essential parts of the ENP reform agenda and managed to avoid the costs. This situation is 
mainly due to the lack of external as well as domestic pressure for adaptation.
6 The Eastern dimension of the ENP originally comprised the Ukraine, Moldova and potentially Belarus, once the 
country would make substantial democratic progress. In 2004, however, the European Commission (successful-
ly) suggested to further expand the ENP to the three states of the Southern Caucasus, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and 
Georgia (cf. Johansson-Nogués 2005).
7 Council Regulation (EC) No. 99/2000 of 29 December 1999.
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4.2	 Prohibitive	Costs	but	Little	Pressure	of	Adaptation
Generally speaking, the ENP reform agenda includes three major dimensions: democracy promotion, 
market integration and security cooperation (cf. Weber et al. 2007). The ENC do not have to take on the 
entire acquis	communautaire. After all, ENP is to provide an alternative to full membership aiming at legal 
approximation rather than harmonization. Still, the ENP offers a “privileged partnership with neighbours”, 
which “will build on mutual commitment to common values principally within the fields of the rule of law, 
good governance, the respect for human rights, and the principles of market economy and sustainable 
development” (European Commission 2004). These common values closely correspond to the famous 
Copenhagen Criteria even though they are not stipulated in the contractual framework that rules the 
relationship between the EU and the ENC. The respect for human rights, rule of law and democracy as 
well as market economy form essential elements of the bilateral Partnership and Cooperation Agreements 
(PCA) and thus constitute a major condition for closer economic and political cooperation with the EU.8 
Thus, while there is no “acquis conditionality”, the ENC are subject to political or democratic conditionality 
(for the distinction see Schimmelfennig/Sedelmeier 2005b). Moreover, the country-specific Action Plans 
(AP), which copy the logic of the accession partnerships in the EU’s enlargement policy, list specific reform 
priorities on which the EU and its partner country have agreed.9 Those reach from improving the business 
and investment climate, increasing transparency and competition in public procurement and state aid, to 
advancing privatization and de-regulation. Next to the harmonization with EU regulations on trade, market 
access, energy and transport, the EU has put increasing emphasis on the area of Justice and Home Affairs, 
including cross-border cooperation and management in order to fight organized crime, money laundering 
and trafficking, as well as migration issues (Lavenex/Wichmann 2009). Good governance constitutes a key 
cross-cutting issue that is – dependent on the situation of the individual ENC – mainstreamed into the 
reform agenda of the PCA and AP. It covers issues such as improving electoral legislation, conducting free 
and fair elections, ensuring the separation of power (particularly with regard to the judiciary), encouraging 
the development of political parties and civil society organizations, granting the independence of media, 
protecting human rights and civil liberties (particularly minority rights) and fighting corruption (Börzel et 
al. 2008).
While the reform agendas agreed between the EU and the individual ENC constitute a comprehensive 
misfit on the domestic institutions, policies and political processes, the EU has not exerted sufficient 
external push to generate pressure for adaptation that could trigger domestic change. The promotion of 
good governance is a case in point. 
In the practical application of the AP, the EU has clearly focussed on enhancing the effectiveness of state 
institutions in providing public goods and services rather than promoting democracy and human rights. 
Its emphasis on output-related reforms reflects a preference for political stability over democratic change 
(Youngs 2009a; Börzel et al. 2009). Still, making state institutions more effective implies a strong emphasis 
on the fight against corruption, which implies huge costs of adaptation. The Action Plans define quite 
8 The Partnership and Cooperation Agreements can be accessed under http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/docu-
ments_en.htm; last access: August 25, 2009.
9 The Action Plans can bee accessed under http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/documents_en.htm; last access: 
August 25, 2009.
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specific anti-corruption measures.10 First, the ENC are asked to accede, ratify and implement international 
conventions that are related to the fight against corruption, such as the UN Convention against Corruption 
(UNCAC), the Council of Europe Criminal and Civil Law Conventions on Corruption or the OECD Convention 
on combating bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. Second, the ENC 
are requested to join international anti-corruption networks such as GRECO and the OECD Anti Corruption 
Network for Eastern Europe and Central Asia (ACN) that assist the countries in developing a special public 
policy against corruption and formulating and implementing the necessary legislative and institutional 
reforms. Accordingly, the ENC have to formulate and implement national anti-corruption policies and 
implementation strategies that ensure compliance with international norms. Finally, each ENP country 
has some additional provisions that largely concentrate on promoting anti-corruption measures within 
the business sector, the administration and/or the law enforcement agencies or improving the legal 
framework for the prosecution of corruption-related crimes. Taken together, the legal and administrative 
changes required by the EU pose a major misfit with domestic structures challenging the political survival 
of incumbent elites who often rely on clientelistic networks rather than outright repression to stay in 
power.
“Bad governance” and endemic corruption prevail in almost all aspects of the ENC political, economic 
and societal life (Hellman et al. 2000). According to Transparency International, the ENC belong to the 
most corrupt countries in the world.11 Political or “grand” corruption is ubiquitous and deep-rooted in 
all ENC. Oligarchic monopolies and the systemic extortion of bribes are detrimental to a competitive 
market economy, impair socio-economic development, and deter foreign investment (Rose-Ackerman 
1996; Bhatty 2002). Clientelism and patronage undermine the democratic process of free and fair 
participation by favouring certain parts of the population and excluding others from the political process 
and the distribution of public goods (Drury et al. 2006; Stokes 2007). Finally, the extensive misuse of 
social networks for particularistic purposes and eventually the increase of social distrust and political 
apathy exert a corrosive effect on the cohesion of the political community, and – in the long term – on the 
territorial integrity of the state itself (UNDP 2006, cf. Shen and Wiliamson 2005, Scott 1972).
While being detrimental to the socio-economic and political development of the ENC, corruption serves 
the purposes of the incumbent regimes. Strategic sources of revenue, as provided by the energy sector in 
Azerbaijan or the metallurgic and energy transport sector in Ukraine are closely linked to the incumbent 
power system (International Crisis Group 2004; Sarna 2002). Particularly in the “closer knit societies” of 
the Southern Caucasus oligarchic monopolies – often controlled by members of the organized crime – 
pervade the overall economic structures of the countries and establish informal institutions of a shadow 
economy parallel to that of the shadow state controlled by the incumbent network (Bowser 2001: 10). 
Corruption does not only yield huge private rents but also allows controlling the access to power and 
resources securing the loyalty of key domestic actors.
In sum, the misfit between ENP requirements for “good governance” policies and institutions, on the one 
hand, and the domestic (power) structures of the ENC, on the other, imposes huge costs of adaptation 
that are often prohibitive for incumbent governments since EU requirements threaten their hold on power. 
10 For a similar argument on democracy, human rights and rule of law standards see Maier/Schimmelfennig 2007.
11 Transparency International Corruption Perception Index 2008, http://www.transparency.org/news_room/in_
focus/2008/cpi2008/cpi_2008_table; last access August 25, 2009.
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Not surprisingly, their willingness to engage in domestic change has been limited. Yet, the EU has hardly 
pushed ENC governments towards domestic reforms necessary to comply with its requirements. 
The ENP was explicitly designed to provide an alternative to membership. Basically, the ENP offers the 
ENC trade and aid in exchange for political and economic reforms. While the EU cannot invoke accession 
conditionality to push for domestic change, it may (threaten to) suspend bilateral agreements, withhold 
assistance, and impose political sanctions (e.g. visa bans). Likewise, the EU can reward progress by 
offering progressive integration into the Internal Market and its regulatory structures (e.g. environmental 
protection). On a more specific level, the EU can upgrade bilateral relations (e.g. association), lift trade 
restrictions (e.g. preferential trade agreement), simplify visa regimes or extend the scope of assistance. 
These possibilities notwithstanding, the EU has been very reluctant to use negative conditionality (Youngs 
2009a; Lavenex 2008). It has abstained from ratifying the PCA with Belarus signed in 1996 due to the 
absence of any democratic reforms (European Commission 2006). Likewise, when the political situation in 
Georgia seriously deteriorated in 2003, part of TACIS funding was suspended and reallocated to projects 
that involved civil society (European Commission 2003b). Other than that, the ENC have felt little pressure 
to engage in domestic reforms to meet ENP goals and requirements. The EU and the ENC jointly set the 
priorities for action. The Action Plans are not legally binding, and the ENC governments are not obliged to 
comply with what they have committed themselves to. Their performance is jointly monitored and subject 
to Political Dialogue. While ENP has largely eschewed negative conditionality, “reinforcement through 
rewards” has been hampered by the low attractiveness of closer relations with the EU to countries that 
face high costs of adaptation in drawing closer to the EU (all ENC), aspire nothing less than membership 
(Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia), command control over substantial resources (Azerbaijan) or maintain close 
relations with Russia (Belarus, Armenia).
While EU conditionality has been weak, it is more than questionable whether anything less than a 
credible membership perspective would yield sufficient benefits to pay-off the costs for authoritarian 
and semi-authoritarian regimes, which are the most powerful veto players when it comes to domestic 
reforms (cf. Schimmelfennig et al. 2006). Access to its internal market is the biggest incentive the EU can 
to offer. The size of the EU market, on the one hand, and the lack of alternative markets, on the other, 
promises important benefits, particularly since the EU has been very protectionist, particularly when it 
comes to agricultural goods, textiles, chemicals, and steel, which are important export goods of the ENC 
(Vachudova 2007). Moreover, renouncing economic integration can cause a diversion of trade, foreign 
direct investments, and aid (Mattli 1999). At the same time, however, participation in the internal market 
requires the implementation of costly and complex regulations, not only in the field of EU competition 
policy, but also with regard to environmental and social product and production standards (Noutcheva/
Emerson 2007). Regulatory alignment, even if only selective, involves high costs and requires regulatory 
capacities that are wanting in the ENC. But even if a rather vague “stake in the internal market” was a 
powerful incentive enough to induce ENC governments into compliance with the EU’s human rights and 
democratic standards, it would do little to bring about domestic reforms since the EU has so far been 
very reluctant to grant full market access, including access for agricultural products, for services and for 
labour (Vachudova 2007). The same holds for the prospect of concessions with regard to the movement 
of people in the area of Justice and Home Affairs, such as visa facilitation (Occhipinti 2007).
The lack of a membership prospective may also explain the inconsistent use of conditionality – if 
membership is not at stake, EU member states appear to be more reluctant to authorize sanctions and 
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withhold rewards, particularly if this would conflict with their economic and geostrategic interests (Smith 
2001: 193-196; Schimmelfennig et al. 2006: 46). This also includes the relations with Russia, which Brussels 
and some member states do not wish to upset by interfering too openly in Moscow’s “near abroad” (Baun 
2007). Finally, the reluctance of the EU to exert external pressure also linked to the weak reform capacities 
of neighbourhood countries. The ENC have only a short experience with independence and state 
consolidation. Their capacities to make and enforce policies are limited (see above; cf. Vachudova 2007; 
Occhipinti 2007). It is not in the interest of the EU to push for substantive reforms that could destabilize 
already fragile state institutions. 
Given the weak capacities of the ENC, the use of soft instruments (capacity-building and socialization) 
might be more appropriate to induce domestic change. Since the early 1990s, the EU has provided the 
Newly Independent States with substantial financial and technical assistance through the TACIS programme. 
TACIS covered the reform priorities, first specified in the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (since 
1997) and later in the ENP Action Plans.12 In 2007, the EU replaced TACIS with a new financial instrument, 
the so-called European Neighbourhood and Partners Instrument (ENPI).13 While assistance under TACIS 
had been provided primarily through jointly managed projects, ENPI introduced a “sector-wide” approach 
allocating the assistance by means of direct budgetary aid to the partner governments. Moreover, it based 
EU assistance on the principle of co-financing and the cooperation with beneficiaries (cf. Börzel et al. 
2008). Both TACIS and ENPI have made EU financial and technical support conditional on the respect 
for democracy, principles of international law and human rights (cf. TACIS 1999: Art. 16; Council of the 
European Union 2006: Art 5). Yet, since the EU has refrained from invoking conditionality prioritizing 
partnership and joint ownership, its capacity-building has largely benefitted reform measures preferred 
by the ENP governments strengthening the capacities of state institutions rather than their democratic 
and human rights record.
The transformative power of socialization and social learning has been equally limited so far. Human rights, 
democracy, the rule of law and good governance form the basic values on which the partnership between 
the EU and the ENC shall be based. Rather than imposing “a pre-determined set of priorities” (European 
Commission 2004: 8), the EU has sought to use political dialogue based on partnership, joint commitment 
and ownership. The partners shall agree on reform agendas that identify priority areas and actions and 
turn them into Action Plans, which are not legally binding. Implementation is again subject to negotiations 
under political dialogue. Joint ownership has further undermined the effectiveness of conditionality by 
precluding the prescription of clear reform targets and tough monitoring by the EU (Noutcheva/Emerson 
2007; Vachudova 2007). While being a precondition for socialization, it is hard to say to what extent 
political dialogue has fostered socialization and social learning processes. The resonance of EU norms 
and values with the domestic institutions of the ENC is far lower than in case of the CEE countries, whose 
political and economic transition had been well under way when they started negotiating their entry into 
the EU. By declaring the ENC “friends” and “neighbours”, the EU made quite clear that it did not consider 
them “members of the club” that is after all based on the very values, norms and principles enshrined in 
12 Further EU programmes addressing the NIS are loans of the	European	Investment	Bank (EIB), assistance by the 
European	Community	Humanitarian	Aid	department (ECHO) the Food	Security	Programme (FSP) as well as direct 
assistance to Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) within the scope of the European	Initiative (since 2006 
Instrument) for	Democracy	and	Human	Rights (EIDHR).
13 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1638/2006 of 24 October 2006.
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the ENP. This somewhat hypocritical approach undermines the legitimacy of EU demands for domestic 
change.14 The attempts of the EU to frame human rights, democracy, the rule of law and good governance 
as “international norms” (Kelley 2006: 40; cf. Kelley 2004a) rather than European values have done little 
to change the perception of the ENC as unwanted by the EU. 
While the EU has done little to increase the willingness of state actors to introduce domestic reforms, 
pressure from below has been virtually absent. If civil society was already weak in the CEE countries, its 
capacities have been even more limited in the ENC. The number and strength of civil society organizations 
– as measured by their membership base or their financial and organizational capacities – as well as their 
scope of protest action are generally low (cf. Howard 2003; Mendelson/Glenn 2002). Notable exceptions 
are the grassroots revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine neither of which, however, brought about 
consolidation of democracy nor a flourishing of civic engagement in their aftermath (cf. Laverty 2008; 
Tudoroiu 2007). On the contrary, the once again dashed hopes for political (and economic) change in both 
countries deepened political fatalism.
Moreover, given the (semi-) authoritarian nature of the ENC, formal supporting institutions, such as 
independent courts or agencies, which could help non-state actors to exert pressure on their governments 
to introduce reforms, are non-existent. Political rights and civil liberties of organized interests are, with 
the exception of Ukraine, severely circumscribed. In some countries, the situation even worsened after 
the so-called “coloured revolutions” took place in Georgia and Ukraine. In Azerbaijan, for instance, the 
2005 parliamentary election exceedingly witnessed violence against oppositional forces and media 
representatives, arrests, blackmailing, and even murder were on the agenda (Valiyev 2006; for a similar 
argument on Belarus Silitski 2003).
Finally, governing elites have impaired the emergence of civil society organizations and interest groups 
by co-opting societal and economic actors into their clientelistic networks. Georgia is an illustrating 
example in this regard. Whereas civil society organizations effectively voiced discontent over the sclerotic 
Shevardnadze government, many formerly leading activists joined the government once he had been 
overthrown (cf. Mitchell 2006). Those who remained independent and critical in the Non-Governmental 
Organization (NGO) sector, by contrast, have increasingly faced difficulties with the authoritarian style 
of the new government under Saakashvili and the once again strained political climate in the country 
(cf. Mitchell 2009; Laverty 2008). Next to political repression, clientelistic networks, which are often the 
only way to get access to public goods, such as health care, have undermined trust in public institutions 
and fostered political apathy. Civil society in the ENC has been increasingly disengaging from the political 
process itself (Bowser 2001).
Unlike in the CEE accession process, the EU has done little to empower non-state actors in the ENC. Since 
2004, the EU started to require ENP partner governments to consult and cooperate with non-state actors 
and civil organisations in the formulation and implementation of the national reform agendas (Buzogany/
Costa 2009; cf. Börzel et al. 2008). Yet, the EU has hardly enforced this requirement. The partnership and 
joint ownership approach has largely deprived the EU of the means to prescribe clear reform targets 
whose implementation is closely monitored; both were preconditions for reform coalition to put pressure 
14 These credibility issues were a major reason why the EU 12 offered the CEE countries a membership perspective 
in 1993 (cf. Schimmelfennig 2003).
20 | KFG Working Paper No. 11 | February 2010 
on their governments in the CEE countries (Sedelmeier 2007). Moreover, unlike other foreign policy 
frameworks, such as EU’s development policy vis-à-vis African, Caribbean and Pacific countries, the ENP 
does not provide for the involvement of civil society in political dialogue. The European Neighbourhood 
and Partners Instrument (ENPI), which officially replaced TACIS in January 2007, requires that EU assistance 
shall be based on a cooperation partnership which “will involve, as appropriate, national, regional and 
local authorities, economic and social partners, civil society and other relevant bodies” (ENPI 2006: Art. 4 
(c)). The regulation also stipulates that the beneficiary partner governments should “associate the relevant 
partners as appropriate, in particular at regional and local level, in the preparation, implementation and 
monitoring of programmes and projects” (ENPI 2006: Art. 4 (d)). Similar to pre-accession funding tools 
for CEE countries, ENPI seeks to strengthen non-state actors by involving them in the implementation of 
EU programmes. It remains to be seen whether this will give organized interests a voice in the domestic 
policy process. So far, the EU has provided technical and financial assistance mainly to state actors seeking 
to strengthen effective rather than inclusive policy-making (see above). Non-state actors were supported 
only to a very limited extent through small-scale programs under the TACIS Institution	Building	Partnership	
Programme	(European Commission 2003c) and the European Initiative for Human Rights (EIDHR). 15
The limited resources and political freedoms of domestic actors, wide-spread corruption and the low 
resonance between EU and domestic norms and values have also constrained the role of (transnational) 
norm entrepreneurs. Civil society organizations have been benefitting from external capacity-building 
and transnational linkages with Western NGOs, trade unions and party foundations, but their political 
autonomy is still constrained since rule of law and democracy are weakly institutionalized. Domestic 
activists, who engage in politically and economically sensitive areas such as the fight against corruption 
and nepotism, live in constant danger to be assaulted or themselves prosecuted on the basis of false 
accusations and fictitious evidence. In “hard” cases such as Belarus, many capacity-building measures 
can only be implemented abroad, due to the obstructive attitude of the authorities. Business in turn is to 
a significant extent still state-owned and state-controlled. Gradual economic reforms and intransparent 
privatization processes cemented a close affiliation of the economic and the political sphere. Domestic 
companies lack the incentives to press for introducing a sound economic framework and the rule of law, 
precisely because they benefit from market distortions. Transnational companies have sought access to 
the ENC, particularly in the energy sector. However, they have little interest in spoiling their relationship 
with the incumbent regime by pushing for domestic reforms (cf. Hellmann 1998; Hoff/Stiglitz 2004). 
With domestic actors hardly able or willing to mobilize in favour of compliance with EU requirements, 
Western NGOs and other norm entrepreneurs have found it difficult to find allies to support and link up 
with as they did in the CEE accession countries. The strong grip of ENC governments on the media and the 
low resonance of EU norms and values with domestic institutions make it hard for epistemic communities 
or advocacy networks to engage domestic actors in a public discourse on the appropriateness of complying 
with EU requirements for domestic reform. The conclusion one should draw from this situation is not that 
EU demands for better governance are completely irrelevant, but rather that most domestic non-state 
actors lack the organizational and ideational resources to mobilize larger parts of the society. Additionally, 
the channelling of resources for civil society building has often led to a short-lived mushrooming of NGOs 
15 EIDHR was established in 1994 as a special thematic budget line to provide direct assistance to non-governmen-
tal organizations. In 2006 the name was changed in European Instrument for Human Rights and Democracy (cf. 
Council regulation EIDHR Regulation (EC) No. 1889/2006).
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that – in the worst case – use external funding as a mere opportunity for income generation (cf. Mateeva 
2008). Moreover, (semi-) authoritarian regimes and the prevalence of informal institutions cause difficulties 
for outsiders to distinguish between organizations that are genuinely interested in change for the better 
and those that use external support as vehicles for political aspirations. Prevailing clientelistic networks 
may work as some kind of informal institutions that facilitate domestic change by fostering consensus and 
paying-off the losers (cf. Grote 1997). Yet, this presupposes that some members of the networks support 
domestic reforms in the first place, which is hardly the case.
4.3	 Reinforcing	Rather	Than	Transforming	Domestic	Structures?
High misfit imposing prohibitive costs to incumbent governments, on the one hand, and low pressure of 
adaptation from above and from below, on the other, render domestic change induced by Europeanization 
extremely unlikely in the ENC. Their unwillingness to engage in substantive reforms is reinforced by 
their limited capacities. The combined efforts of the EU and other external actors have made the ENC 
governments introduce some domestic reforms. However, those are selective and hardly involve civil 
society or companies in their formulation and implementation. State actors clearly dominate and control 
the ways in which EU demands for domestic change are handled at the national level. They “pick and 
choose” from the EU’s reform menu and avoid costly measures that would introduce some significant 
domestic change. Over all, the focus of the EU and its Neighbourhood Policy on strengthening the 
effectiveness of state institutions has helped to stabilize the incumbent regimes rather than encouraged 
domestic reforms. The fight against corruption is a case in point. While the ENC have developed national 
Anti-Corruption Strategies, the governments have managed to capture and control the implementation 
process or even used EU anti-corruption prescriptions to justify the disempowerment of political opponents 
or discipline internal rivals by cutting off their resources. Corruption purges are used to delegitimize the 
previous regime (Georgia), to eliminate opposition within or outside of the ruling network (Azerbaijan), 
to manipulate the political agenda (Armenia), or to decrease the incidence of corruption and thereby 
legitimate the current regime (all ENC). Thus, corruption allegations still dominate the political discourses 
and are used as a viable tool for seeking legitimacy and securing political power (cf. Darden 2001; Sajo 
1998). Moreover, even in Georgia and Ukraine, where public discontent helped to oust governments that 
were deemed corrupt and in which allegedly reform-minded successor governments have come to power, 
little has changed (Tudoroiu 2007). 
If the EU has made an impact on the ENC at all, it has helped them make some progress in providing (selective) 
public goods and services, while their democratic quality appears to have stalled or even deteriorated 
(figure 3). These findings are corroborated by the literature on the EU’s Mediterranean neighbourhood. 
Its Southern neighbours are consolidated states with authoritarian regimes (the exception being Israel). 
Since the establishment of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in 1995, the EU has sought to export 
security, stability and prosperity to the Mediterranean (Youngs 2001). Human rights, democracy, the rule 
of law and good governance have been mainstreamed into the Barcelona Process (Van Hüllen/Stahn 
2009). Yet, the Mediterranean countries have experienced a kind of “authoritarian stability” and rising 
income levels, which are higher than those of the ENC (Noutcheva/Emerson 2007: 87). Unlike in Eastern 
Europe, political elites do hardly pretend to be democracies and do not lean on the European project to 
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legitimize their domestic agenda. Being increasingly under pressure from Islamist forces, the Southern 
Arab regimes are far less receptive to the norms and values promoted by the EU, which does not consider 
them to be eligible for membership in the European club either. Not being able to call on common values, 
the EU has been reluctant to push good governance emphasizing economic reforms and offering market 
access as an incentive (Youngs 2001). The EU’s economic leverage, however, is weakened by the more 
symmetric relations with some Mediterranean states for their importance for its energy supplies (Algeria) 
and the trade concessions already granted (Tunisia). While the EU has employed democracy assistance 
and political dialogue, it “has sought a ‘depressurizing’ liberalization of Middle Eastern regimes that helps 
to stabilize governments rather than the kind of short-term systemic political change that may bring to 
power Islamist parties” (Youngs 2009a: 911). Closer relations with the EU have done next to nothing so 
far to improve the democratic quality of Mediterranean regimes (cf. Sedelmeier 2007; Schimmelfennig/
Scholtz 2009).
5.  Conclusion
The domestic impact of the EU clearly hits beyond its borders. Since the end of the Cold War, the EU 
has sought actively to Europeanize not only would-be members but also third countries, particularly if 
they are located in its immediate neighbourhood. To export its constitutional principles and sectoral 
policies, the EU has developed a sophisticated tool box that actively employs the Europeanization 
mechanisms identified by the literature on Europeanization and domestic change in EU member states 
and CEE accession countries. While the transformative power of the EU declines with the decreasing 
degree of democracy and state capacity, the Europeanization mechanisms still apply and can account 
for the limited domestic impact the EU has exercised so far when it seeks to hit beyond its borders. 
The findings of this paper on the Eastern European Neighbourhood Countries may be biased by the focus 
on political institutions; both in the EU 15 and the CEE accession countries, the EU’s impact has been much 
greater on policy than on politics and polity. To what extent Europeanization has affected the democratic 
institutions of its member states, is contested in the literature. Students of Europeanization seem to agree 
that national parliaments are the losers of European integration (Maurer/Wessels 2001; Schmidt 2006), 
which has been confirmed by the executive dominance in the CEE accession process (Raik 2004; Zubek 
2008). Whether this has resulted in a substantial decline of democracy, however, is another question. The 
data suggest otherwise (figure 3). Both the EU 15 and the CEE 10 moved up in the Freedom House Index 
between 1998 and 2008. While the old member states have always been high up in the rankings, the CEE 
countries worked their way up from an average score of 2.6 in 1992 to 1.25 in 2008. This is not to say 
that EU accession has been the main driver. But it seems that the EU – and other international actors – 
have supported rather than undermined the endogenously driven transition process in the CEE accession 
countries (cf. Sadurski 2004; Kelley 2004b; Schimmelfennig et al. 2006). The impact of the EU on their 
state capacity is equally difficult to discern. Unlike the ENC – and the Western Balkans – the CEE were and 
have remained consolidated states when they started their transition to democracy and market economy 
in the 1990s. As a result, democratization has not undermined the overall capacity of the state to provide 
(regulations for) public goods and services. Quite on the contrary, regulatory quality has further improved, 
with most CEE countries having caught up with the EU 15. Only Romania and Bulgaria are still lagging behind.
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Figure	3:	Transformative	Power	Europe?
We still lack reliable data to draw any causal inferences between the EU’s attempts to transform the 
domestic structures of accession and neighbourhood countries, on the one hand, and changes in the 
effectiveness and democratic quality of their institutions, on the other. However, figure 3 suggests some 
interesting correlations that are supported by the emerging empirical research on the domestic impact 
of the EU on the Western Balkans and the European Neighbourhood Countries. The lessons of Eastern 
enlargement seem to be confirmed: the external leverage of the EU, particularly when it comes to 
democratic reforms, depends on a credible accession prospective, non-prohibitive compliance costs and 
the existence of liberal reform coalitions (Schimmelfennig 2005; Vachudova 2005; Magen/Morlino 2008; 
Schimmelfennig/Scholtz 2009). The ENC lack both. Thus, even if they received an accession prospective, 
this would be unlikely to increase the transformative power of the EU. Not only is it questionable whether 
the size of membership benefits would be big enough to pay off the costs of adaptation for incumbent 
regimes. Precisely because the misfit is so high, EU membership is a very distant reward and, given the 
general enlargement fatigue of the EU, there is no certainty that the ENC would receive the promised 
rewards even after fulfilling the EU’s conditions. Unlike in Eastern enlargement, the EU has refrained from 
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a consistent and merit-based application of conditionality under ENP. As a result, the EU’s reliance on 
assistance and political dialogue has strengthened state institutions and, hence, stabilized the power of 
semi-authoritarian regimes rather than fostered their transformation. The Ukraine is the only ENC that 
has made some progress towards democracy. But even in this case, Europeanization has worked as a 
catalyst rather than the main driver of domestic change (Gawrich et al. 2009; Youngs 2009b). The other 
ENC have deteriorated in the democratic quality of their institutions.
The Western Balkans, by contrast, are on a similar trajectory as the CEE were in the 1990s. Unlike in the 
ENC, the EU and other international actors have been heavily investing in state-building using not only 
assistance, conditionality and political dialogue, but also physical and legal coercion (Youngs 2009a). In 
1999, the EU promised candidate status to Croatia, Macedonia, Albania, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(FRY), and Bosnia-Herzegovina as soon as they would meet the Copenhagen criteria. The strong presence 
of the international community and EU membership prospective have certainly empowered existing 
liberal reform coalitions, albeit to a lesser extent than in the CEE. Due to the lower level of democracy, 
compliance costs are considerably higher. Governmental actors have instrumentalized EU conditionality 
and assistance to consolidate their own power rather than advance domestic reforms (Elbasani 2009; 
Youngs 2009a; Vachudova 2008; Noutcheva 2009). The capacity and willingness for domestic reform is not 
only weaker due to the lower degree of state capacity and democracy. The credibility of the membership 
prospective is increasingly undermined by the enlargement fatigue of the EU and the reluctant use of 
conditionality due to fragility of state institutions caused by corruption and ethnic conflict (Youngs 2009a; 
Schimmelfennig 2008). Like in the case of the ENC, the EU has put post-war reconstruction, state- and 
institution-building first (Emerson et al. 2005; Noutcheva/Emerson 2007). The inconsistent application 
of conditionality in the Western Balkans (Luckau forthcoming) has also weakened the EU’s leverage on 
Turkey (Tocci 2005; Ugur 1999).16 The earliest date that Turkey could enter the EU is 2013, and Ankara is 
still aiming to comply with EU law by this date.17 The EU, however, has refused to back 2013 as a deadline 
– pushing accession back as far as 2021.18  
The inconsistent use of membership conditionality does not only mitigate the transformative power of 
the EU in the Western Balkans and Turkey; it damages its international credibility as a “normative power” 
creating a different capacity-expectation gap (Hill 1993; Holland 2003: 135). Why should the ENC and other 
countries engaged with the EU make any efforts to fulfil EU requirements for the respect of human rights, 
democracy, the rule of law and good governance, if the EU is neither willing to reward those, who comply, 
nor is capable of punishing others, who do not? The civilian power identity of the EU, which favours a 
“developmentalist” approach of creating the economic and social conditions for political transformation 
rather than pushing for rapid regime change (Baun 2007), is no excuse for an inconsistent use of its soft 
power.
16 Schimmelfennig argues that EU enlargement policy is still consistently linked to compliance with democratic 
norms, but acknowledges drawbacks in accession negotiations with Turkey, Serbia and Croatia, which he links to 
high political costs caused by issues o f national identity or legacies of ethnic conflicts (Schimmelfennig 2008).
17 Kubosova, Lucia “Turkey targets 2013 for EU legal compliance”, in: EUobserver; http://euobserver.com/9/23813; 
last access August 25, 2009.
18 Kubosova, Lucia “Brussels declines to endorse 2013 date for Turkey‘s EU entry”, in: EUobserver; http://euobser-
ver.com/9/23881; last access August 25, 2009. Interview with the President of the European Commission, José 
Manuel Barroso, on BBC	Sunday	AM, at October 15, 2006; http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/president/
pdf/interview_20061015_en.pdf; last access August 25, 2009.
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